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Chapter I 3 
Parties, Leaders, and 
the National Debt 
Daniel J. Palazzolo 
There is widespread agreement that the United States is headed for a train wreck 
of massive proportions if its leaders do not address the problem of the national 
debt. However, the nation's leaders appear unable to agree to terms about a 
potential solution, a dynamic that poses fundamental concerns about the capacity 
of the constitutional system and ability of citizens to self-govern. The conventional 
wisdom holds that politicians are chiefly concerned about reelection, so they refuse 
to make tough choices that might offend constituencies and powerful interest groups. 
Of particular consequence is the growing polarization of the parties and inability 
to find common ground. Dan Palazzolo's analysis provides some cause for hope 
while offering a concise description for how the nation got into the debt crisis. 
Most theories of Congress predict stalemate on budget policy. Palazzolo's historical 
approach, using "process tracing," highlights situations in which crises, shifts in public 
opinion, changes in institutional procedures, and shrewd actions of leaders might lead 
to bipartisan outcomes. In other words, structural constraints, such as polarization 
and electoral incentives, do not necessarily prevent leaders from acting to solve the 
nation's problems. Palazzolo's case study analysis challenges theories that rely too 
heavily on single-factor explanations of policy outcomes. It calls for scholars to study 
politics with a deeper and nuanced understanding of the character of problems and 
ability of political leaders to move beyond the constraints of politics as usual. 
Just days before his inauguration as the forty-fourth President of the United 
States in January 2009, Barack Obama described the urgency of dealing with 
the national debt and future spending on entitlement programs for senior 
citizens, Medicare and Social Security: 
What we have done is kicked this can down the road. We are now at the 
end of the road and are not in a position to kick it any further. We have to 
signal seriousness in this by making sure some of the hard decisions are 
made under my watch, not someone else's. 1 
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After two consecutive years of unprecedented budget deficits, Republican 
congressional candidates campaigned against the president's economic policies 
and the rising debt in the 2010 midterm election campaigns, won a majority of 
seats in the House of Representatives, and elected Representative Paul Ryan (R-
WI) to be Chair of the House Budget Committee. As he was about to introduce 
the House Republican budget in April 2011, Ryan recycled the president's 
metaphor to frame the choice facing policy makers: "It all comes down to this: 
Either you fix this problem now ... or you pick the president's path, which is do 
nothing, punt, duck, kick the can down the road, and then we have a debt crisis 
and then its pain for everybodY:' 2 
The views expressed by Obama and Ryan illuminate a puzzle of contemporary 
budget politics: Though leaders of both parties know that the federal debt is 
unsustainable and entitlement programs need to be reformed, major policy 
solutions are bypassed, and the debt continues to fester. Why, according to 
Obama, had policymakers before him "kicked the can down the road?" Why 
had the president, according to Ryan, joined the game? If they agree on the 
urgency of the problem, why cannot Obama and Ryan-and the two parties 
they represent-agree to a solution? What does the persistent debt say about 
the capacity of our constitutional system and the ability of leaders to address 
the nation's most pressing challenges? 
According to the prevailing wisdom of Washington politics, the puzzle is 
easily solved, and we know how the story will end. The political parties are so 
polarized and so unwilling to risk losing elections that they avoid the necessary 
compromises on taxes and spending that would reduce the debt. 3 Even ifleaders 
of opposite parties, such as Obama and Ryan, agree that reducing the national 
debt is a priority, they disagree fundamentally about how to accomplish that 
goal.4 Politics take over, and reducing the debt is subordinated to other budget 
priorities defended by the two parties: Republicans argue for lowering taxes 
and maintaining a strong national defense, Democrats for investing in social 
progress and protecting entitlement programs.5 Rather than compromise, the 
parties blame the other side for failing to address the problem, and the debt 
grows. Ultimately, if partisan polarization prevails, the country loses. At the 
least, a debt crisis will cause chronic inflation and sluggish economic growth 
for decades; in the worst case, the United States may experience a major stock 
market collapse, hyperinflation, double-digit interest rates, and even political 
instability.6 
Yet, though political scientists have done extensive quantitative analysis 
to show that congressional parties have become more polarized over the 
past three decades, several scholars have shown that the role of parties in the 
policy-making process is more complicated than polarization theories suggest 
and that we do not fully understand the effects of partisan polarization on 
specific policy issues. Moreover, though the worst consequences of the debt are 
certainly possible, the budget process does not always end in gridlock. Thus, we 
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should complement structural explanations of partisan politics derived from 
quantitative analysis of a large number of undifferentiated issues with case 
studies of particular issues. 
The new direction to budget politics proposed here applies an existing mode 
of analysis-process tracing-to explain bipartisan deal making in an era of 
polarized parties.7 I design hypotheses to determine the extent to which the 
expectations of party polarization theory apply to the budget deficit. Then by 
drawing from case studies of budget reforms in the 1980s and 1990s and tracing 
the sequence of events that led to the passage of the 2011 Budget Control Act, 
I show how crises, procedural deadlines, changes in public opinion, and the 
choices and actions of leaders affect deficit politics. Process tracing produces 
evidence of partisan polarization and exceptions to partisanship in deficit 
politics. Before deploying this approach, we need to draw a clearer picture of 
the scope, causes, and potential effects of the debt problem and review scholarly 
approaches to the topic. 
Debt Dilemma 
Not all deficits are created equal. Although annual budget deficits are nothing 
new in American politics, the deficits we face today are much more difficult 
to address than ever before. According to James Savage, deficits were held 
in check from the Founding era at least until the Great Depression because 
Congress and the president held to the longstanding norm of balancing the 
budget. 8 Aside from funding wars, the federal government of the United States 
did not raise or spend much money.9 Wars were financed by taxes or bonds 
paid off over time, and recessions were ultimately followed by economic 
recoveries. In the 1930s, the size and scope of the federal budget changed as 
the role of government changed.10 New Deal programs created in the 1930s 
financed jobs that reflected Keynesian fiscal policy whereby government 
sought to stimulate economic growth by creating consumer demand in a 
depressed economy. The New Deal also featured social welfare programs for 
the poor, the unemployed, and the elderly, including the creation of Social 
Security in 1935.11 Yet, those programs and subsequent wars in the twentieth 
century caused only temporary budget deficits. The publicly held debt grew to 
nearly 109 percent of GDP during World War II but dropped rapidly after the 
war ended (Figure 13.1).12 Until the 1960s, the vast bulk offederal spending 
was "discretionary;' meaning that spending levels could be changed annually 
through the congressional appropriations process. Spending allocations for 
most programs changed incrementally.13 
Yet, after a landslide victory in the 1964 election, President Lyndon Johnson 
and Democratic majorities in Congress enacted Great Society legislation, 
including entitlement programs that expanded mandatory spending.14 Johnson 
and Congress adopted two government health care programs-Medicare for the 
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elderly and Medicaid for the poor-and numerous other mandatory programs 
from food stamps to studentloans. Under Johnson and his successor, Republican 
President Richard Nixon, Congress regularly increased Social Security benefits 
and, under Nixon, it indexed numerous programs for inflation. In little more 
than ten years, policy makers of both parties dramatically increased the welfare 
state (see Table 13.1). 
Eventually, a budget based primarily on discretionary programs that could be 
controlled by altering annual spending levels became dominated by mandatory 
spending that varies with uncontrollable conditions. Thus, if unemployment 
increases, so does spending for unemployment compensation, food stamps, 
and income support; if inflation grows, so does spending for programs indexed 
for inflation; if health care costs grow, so do the costs of Medicare and Medicaid; 
and so on. The only way to control mandatory spending is to change the laws 
that determine eligibility for program benefits. 
The transformation from discretionary to mandatory programs is illustrated 
in Figure 13.2. In 1965, before the passage of Medicare and Medicaid and the 
rapid expansion other entitlements, the portion of discretionary spending 
in the federal budget was more than twice the size of mandatory spending; 
twenty years later, the portion of discretionary spending marginally exceeded 
mandatory spending; and by 2011, mandatory spending had greatly surpassed 
discretionary spending in the federal budget. Mandatory spending also grew 
dramatically in relation to the U.S. economy. From 1965 to 2011, mandatory 
spending tripled from 4.6 percent to 13.5 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP), whereas discretionary spending actually declined from 11.3 percent to 
9 percent of GDP. 
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Table 13. I Creation and expansion of entitlement benefits: 1960s and 1970s 
Program created Year Program indexed for inflation Year 
Food Stamps 1964 Civil Service Retirement 1962 
Medicaid 1965 Military Retirement 1963 
Medicare 1965 Coal Miners Disability 1969 
Student Loans 1965 Food Stamps 1971 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 1972 Social Security (OASDI) 1972 
Medicaid 1973 
Supplemental Security Income 1974 
(SSI) 
Railroad Retirement 1974 
Social Security benefit increases 
7% Increase 1965 
13% Increase 1967 
15% Increase 1969 
10% Increase 1970 
20% Increase 1972 
11% Increase 1973 
Sources: Dennis S. Ippolito, Why Budgets Matter: Budget Policy and American Politics (University 
Park: Penn State Press, 2003), Chapter 6; Dennis S. Ippolito, Uncertain Legacies: Federal Budget 
Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1990), 175; Kent Weaver, 
Automatic Government: The Politics of Indexation (Washington DC: Brookings, 1988), 43. 
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On the revenue side of the budget, the government raises money mainly 
through income, corporate, and payroll taxes, 18 but it also loses revenue through 
tax expenditures (i.e., "provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special 
exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a 
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability"). 19 Unlike 
entitlement programs that emerged mainly in two large waves during the 1930s 
and 1960s, tax expenditures developed gradually over time, beginning with 
mortgage interest deduction in 1913.20 The current tax code contains about 
200 tax expenditures for individuals and corporations that cost more than 
$1.1 trillion per year.21 The five most costly tax expenditures for 2008 granted 
exclusions for health care insurance ($288 billion), retirement income ($120 
billion), state and local taxes ($74 billion), mortgage interest deductions ($67 
billion), and charitable contributions ($47 billion).22 
The shift toward mandatory spending and the growth of tax expenditures, 
combined with the economic effects of high unemployment and inflation, 
produced chronic budget deficits after 1969 (Figure 13.3). The deficits were 
exacerbated by tax cuts and defense spending increases in the early 1980s. Yet, 
after a series of modest deficit reduction agreements in the 1980s and three 
larger deals-1990, 1993, and 1997-the budget was balanced for four straight 
years (1998-2001).23 However, fiscal restraint did not last long. Beginning in 
2001, several unfunded initiatives- tax cuts, spending for wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, prescription drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries, and 
economic stimulus measures consisting of domestic spending increases and 
"temporary" tax cuts-combined with two recessions drove annual deficits 
to unprecedented levels.24 Thus, the national debt rose sharply (Figure 13.1). 
Moreover, because recurring deficits are "structural" (i.e., they result from 
spending that exceeds revenue even when the economy is healthy), economic 
growth alone will not solve the problem.25 
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In December 2010, the Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 
created by President Barack Obama to identify solutions to chronic deficits 
and the rising national debt, reported: "Our nation is on an unsustainable 
fiscal path. Spending is rising and revenues are falling short, requiring the 
government to borrow huge sums each year to make up the difference. We 
face staggering deficits:'26 Annual budget deficits have exceeded $1 trillion 
every year from 2009 to 2011, and the national debt, which surpassed $15 
trillion at the outset of 2012, currently grows at a rate of more than $3.2 
million per minute and $4.6 billion per day.27 The national debt held by the 
public nearly doubled from 33 percent of GDP in 2001-the last year the 
federal budget was balanced-to 62 percent in 2010. Without major spending 
reductions and/or tax increases, publicly held debt will approach 90 percent 
of GDP by 2020, at which time just the cost of interest on the debt will reach 
$1 trillion.28 Unlike after World War II, when the government had a plan to 
restore fiscal balance, future demographic trends will put immense pressure 
on federal spending. By 2011, the baby boomers began retiring at a rate of 
10,000 individuals per day. The number of people older than age sixty-five is 
projected to grow from about 40.2 million ( 13 percent of the population) in 
2010 to 64 million (18 percent of the population) in 2025 and to 88.5 million 
(more than 20 percent of the population) in 2050. As Figure 13.1 illustrates, 
under the alternative Congressional Budget Office scenario, the national debt 
will soar after 2020.29 
The fiscal consequences of the disparity between workers who pay taxes 
and retirees who earn benefits are almost unfathomable. In 2008, when the 
fiscal situation was much better than it was four years later, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that future unfunded liabilities of 
the federal government exceeded $53 trillion dollars.30 In other words, due 
mainly to an increasingly dependent aging population and rising health care 
costs, the government has made $53 trillion worth of promises (primarily to 
future recipients of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security) that it has no 
plan to pay for.31 To put this number into perspective, former Comptroller 
General David Walker reported if we " ... put aside and invest today enough 
to cover these promises tomorrow. It would take approximately $455,000 per 
American household-or $175,000 for every man, woman, and child in the 
United States."32 
In sum, the debt dilemma consists of three components: large annual 
deficits that require additional borrowing, a complex tax code that drains 
revenues, and massive unfunded commitments to a growing dependent 
population. Moreover, elected officials face a daunting political reality: The 
programs and tax policies that drive the debt are very popular, strongly 
supported by the organized interests, and intensely debated by leaders of the 
two political parties. 
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Scholarly Approaches 
With the emergence of deficits in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars sought to 
identify the political causes of large, chronic budget deficits and explain 
why policymakers struggled to develop policies to reduce the deficit. Those 
studies focused on the effects of interest groups, public opinion, political 
parties, and budget rules on deficit reduction policy. As the parties became 
more polarized around tax and spending issues, a phenomena that began in 
the 1980s but became more consequential as time when on, scholars focused 
on the extent to which partisan polarization affected Washington politics in 
general, including deficit politics. From the onset of deficit politics, scholars 
have also debated the functionality of the U.S. Constitution by considering 
the degree to which congressional leaders and the president are capable of 
addressing major problems. Toward this end, the literature on budget politics 
includes analysis of cases in which the budget process produced deficit 
reduction policies that ultimately led to a balanced budget in 1998.33 Yet, 
since deficits returned to unprecedented levels, the debt has skyrocketed, and 
the parties have become increasingly polarized, questions about whether and 
how we can govern are back. 
Rooted in pluralist theories of American politics, one theory claims that 
"Special interest politics is the main cause of excessive spending and deficit 
expansion:'34 Jonathan Rauch used longitudinal data from a range of sources 
to illustrate relationships between the growth of groups, lobbyists, campaign 
contributions, and entitlement benefits. The advent of benefit programs and tax 
expenditures described earlier contributed to the growth of organized interest 
groups, a condition Rauch refers to as "hyperpluralism:'35 Organized groups 
have an economic incentive to defend government programs because the 
groups can survive only if the programs survive. Thus, interest groups fought 
very hard to block attempts to cut spending or raise taxes. 36 
Though interest groups demonstrated the ability to stymie budget reforms, 
other scholars argue that their influence should not be overstated. In his account 
of Social Security reform, Aaron Wildavsky pointed out: 
In 1982 ... despite strong opposition of civil service unions, members were 
required to contribute to social security, which was subtracted from their 
pensions. The unions did everything right politically; they launched a 
major campaign against inclusion. The trouble was their little juggernaut 
was overwhelmed by a much bigger one, the gripping concern that social 
security retirement might become insolvent.37 
In 1986, well-heeled corporate lobbyists wound up on the losing end of 
the Tax Reform Act, and many individual tax preferences were traded in for a 
consolidation of tax rates. 38 
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For Wildavsky, and his co-author Joseph White, who wrote an extensive 
account of budget battles through the 1980s, the primary reason for persistent 
deficits could be traced to contrasting views held by members of Congress 
about how best to represent public opinion. 39 Americans want Congress to 
reduce deficits, but they also opposed raising taxes or cutting entitlement 
programs. Therefore, either the same people held contradictory policy 
preferences or, more likely, elected officials represented different "publics" -
one that felt more strongly about taxes, the other about spending. Bound to 
represent their constituents, most members of Congress worried about deficits, 
but some favored cutting spending, others raising taxes. Both positions seemed 
perfectly legitimate and consistent with public opinion, but, taken together, 
they posed a collective action problem. The problem remains today. But since 
surveys show that the public holds conflicting preferences, leaders can choose 
either to exploit differences over taxes and spending or seek consensus around 
a common goal of deficit reduction. Leaders may also interpret election results 
to mean that the public wants the parties to compromise or, conversely, that it 
wants one party to carry out a deficit reduction plan.40 
In terms of evaluating the role of party in policy making during the 1980s 
and 1990s, scholars primarily considered the effects of party control of the 
White House and Congress. Those who adhered to the responsible party 
school of thought argued that a single party needed to control both branches 
of government for government to pass major legislation.41 Yet, David Mayhew 
found that party control of government had no effect on passage of major 
legislation from World War II through 1990. As two of the three major deficit 
reduction deals of the 1990s passed under divided party government, Mayhew's 
finding seemed to apply to the budget. As Charles Jones observed, because 
significant deficit reduction plans require elected officials to vote for unpopular 
choices, government may work better when responsibility for policy is diffused 
across the parties, rather than assumed by one of the parties. 42 
Studies that highlight the adverse effects of groups, public opinion, and 
parties on deficit reduction policy assume that electoral goals are preeminent 
in the minds of decision makers. To the extent that members of Congress 
are single-minded seekers of reelection,43 they would naturally avoid tax and 
spending choices that are opposed by organized groups and are unpopular 
with voters. Political scientists who assume that members of Congress and 
party leaders are motivated by multiple goals-including reelection, making 
good public policy, and gaining influence within Congress-illustrate how 
leaders might pursue strategies that were designed to solve public problems 
and that may or may not have a direct electoral benefit.44 Richard Fenno used 
a qualitative case approach-a combination of interviews, observations, and 
analysis of events-to describe how Senator Pete Domenici, Republican Chair 
of the Senate Budget Committee, sought to build consensus around a range of 
policy choices through deliberation, negotiation, and compromise.45 
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Leadership efforts to build consensus will vary with short-term conditions. 
Using case study analysis, Paul Light showed how a crisis in funding Social 
Security ultimately forced a few policy makers from both parties to develop 
a plan outside of the public view in 1983.46 Daniel Franklin describes how a 
Republican president and Democratic congressional leaders forged a major 
deficit reduction deal in 1990 under the pressure of automatic budget cuts.47 
By tracing the budget process through a single, successful case, I showed 
how changes in public opinion and election results encouraged a Democratic 
president and Republican congressional leaders to negotiate a budget deal in 
1997. In all three cases, policymakers had failed to reach agreement in previous 
trials, and leaders ultimately took advantage of congressional rules and 
procedures that facilitate passage of major legislation.48 1hus, under the right 
conditions, leaders can build majorities within and across party lines in favor 
of deficit reduction and in spite of interest group demands, partisan differences, 
public opinion, and concerns about reelection. 
Of course, when deficits returned after 2001, for the next decade-with the 
exception of the Budget Control Act of 2011-the only budget outcomes to 
explain were policies that increased deficits or failed to control deficit spending.49 
To the extent that leaders matter in terms of deficit politics, the choices and 
actions of presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and the acquiescence 
of party leaders in Congress, contributed to the size of the national debt for 
most of this period. Yet, according to the conventional wisdom, the primary 
culprit is the rise in partisan polarization, a process that began as far back as 
1970 but has gained strength over time. As Ronald Brownstein puts it: "The 
central obstacle to more effective action against our most pressing problems is 
an unrelenting polarization of American politics that has divided Washington 
and the country into hostile, even irreconcilable camps:•so 
Partisan polarization is typically defined as an alignment between 
ideological views and partisan affiliation. As summarized by Nolan McCarty, 
Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, "There are two complementary 
facets to the polarization story. First, at the level of individual members of 
Congress, moderates are vanishing. Second, the two parties have pulled 
apart. Conservatives and Liberals have become almost perfect synonyms for 
Republicans and Democrats:•si To support those conclusions, McCarty, Poole, 
and Rosenthal use of a comprehensive indicator of roll call voting by members 
of Congress-the DW Nominate score-that measures the voting records of 
members of Congress along a liberal/conservative dimension.52 Other scholars 
use these data and measures of party unity and interest group ratings to show 
that members of Congress have become more polarized along party lines.53 
Though roll-call vote studies provide substantial evidence of increased party 
polarization,54 scholars debate the causes and consequences of polarization. 
According to one view, polarization stems from the voters. Either because 
of gerrymandering of congressional redistricting,55 choices by Americans of 
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like minds to live near one another, 56 or changes in political attitudes,57 most 
congressional districts are either predominantly Democratic or predominantly 
Republican. When elected representatives act upon their constituents' opinions 
on public policy, they coalesce with members of their own party, who represent 
constituents with similar beliefs, and against members of the opposite party, 
who represent constituents with different beliefs.58 Alan Abramowitz explains, 
because "members of Congress generally reflect the views of their parties' 
electoral bases ... Polarization in Congress reflects polarization in the American 
electorate:'59 According to another school of thought, partisan polarization is 
primarily a result of growing ideological differences among the "political class" 
or political elites-party and group activists, elected officials, and the news 
media. Morris Fiorina, a leading proponent of this view, has argued that the 
public has not become polarized or at least not nearly as much as members of 
Congress. 60 
A third view, advanced by Sean Theriault, finds that increased party 
polarization in Congress is not so much caused by voters, elites, or redistricting 
but results primarily from the way party leaders use powers of agenda setting 
and rule making in the House and by rules and filibusters in the Senate.61 
Theriault's conclusion coincides with other studies that argue that the degree 
of partisan polarization in Washington, the linkage between partisanship and 
electoral factors, and the effects of polarization on policy making are often 
overstated. Joseph Cooper and Garry Young and Charles Jones point out that, 
even in the era of polarized parties, many bills are passed by bipartisan and 
cross-partisan majorities.62 David Rohde argues that the influence of party in 
the legislative process is conditional; the degree of partisanship depends on the 
extent to which the parties divide on particular issues.63 Steven Smith argues 
that, although members of Congress are motivated by reelection and party 
leaders seek to win a majority of seats in the legislature, leaders also seek to 
advance their party's policy interests and respond to national problems. 64 Other 
scholars argue that the goals, choices, and actions of party leaders independently 
affect the degree to which partisanship shapes policymaking and institutional 
change.65 Taken together, these studies suggest that the congruence between 
voters and their representatives is not neatly or tightly held together by party 
allegiance on all issues, at all times, and by all leaders. 
Political scientists also have mixed views of the extent to which party 
polarization affects the ability of the president and Congress to address major 
issues. Though Fiorina concludes that the consequences of party polarization for 
successful policymaking are uncertain and deserve further study,66 Abramowitz 
deduces that polarization affects policymaking; a polarized electorate gives 
members of Congress little incentive to work across party lines.67 Several 
political scientists, including Sarah Binder and Thomas Mann and Norman 
Ornstein look mainly at the effect of polarization on the institutional well-
being and reputation of Congress, but they also conclude that rising levels of 
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polarization, combined with divided party control of government, increases 
chance of policy stalemate.68 By contrast, in a study of major legislation 
introduced by presidents since World War II, David Mayhew argues that parties 
have not undermined representation or the separation of powers, and most 
legislation reflects the general preferences of the American public. Moreover, 
it remains an open question whether increased partisan polarization subverts 
the ability of Congress and the president to achieve policy goals under divided 
party control. 69 
Deficit Politics and Party Polarization From a 
Process Tracing Approach 
Arguments about the causes and consequences of party polarization are 
typically based on quantitative analysis of a large number of cases from selected 
survey data and comprehensive measures of roll-call voting in Congress, but 
how do we determine the extent to which deficits politics, in particular, are 
polarized along party lines? My research involves process tracing, a method 
that begins with prior knowledge or regularities of political phenomena, closely 
traces and describes the sequence of events in the development of policy 
outcomes, identifies relevant causal variables to explain those outcomes, and 
designs hypothesis tests using qualitative or quantitative data. Though space 
limitations prevent a complete description of process tracing methodology or a 
detailed account of failed and successful budget agreements, we can test specific 
hypothesis about deficit politics suggested by the literature on polarization and 
highlight the key features of the 2011 budget battle. 70 
Hypothesis I: Parties in Congress 
lhe first hypothesis deals with the degree to which the parties are polarized on 
budget votes in Congress. Since polarization began in the 1980s and grew over 
time, we should expect more cross-partisan and bipartisan deficit reduction 
agreements in the 1980s than the 1990s and thereafter. As the center of the 
ideological spectrum shrunk over time, so should partisan cooperation and 
agreement. In particular, more Republicans should have been amenable to tax 
increases in the 1980s compared with the 1990s and beyond.71 Those patterns 
generally hold up, though some of the results do not reflect the expectations of 
polarized parties. 
From 1982 to 1989, when the forces of partisan polarization had not 
completely set in, a Republican president and a Congress with at least one 
chamber controlled by Democrats enacted eight acts that reduced deficits by 
either increasing taxes and/ or cutting spending (a total off our packages included 
some form of revenue increase, either by closing loopholes or increasing excise 
taxes). Four of eight acts amounted to very small budget savings, though the 
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combined effect of the other four exceeded $500 billion in deficit reduction 
over fifteen years. In spite of the savings, since the deficit persisted throughout 
the Reagan presidency, one could certainly argue that the progress toward 
deficit reduction was not sufficient. Moreover, in 1986, Congress and the 
president also enacted the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, which sought to 
impose automatic spending cuts to meet specified deficit targets leading to a 
balanced budget over five years. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law was a sign 
that advocates of deficit reduction had capitulated to the forces of gridlock by 
putting in place procedures to do the job that elected officials could not.72 
Deficit reduction agreements in the 1990s and the Budget Act of 2011 are 
more difficult to explain with a single theory. From 1990 to 1997, three major 
deficit reduction deals, each containing a mixture of taxes and spending cuts, 
were passed and produced $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction. Congress also 
passed a welfare reform bill in 1996 that projected savings of $54 billion over five 
years. The 1993 budget deal fits squarely into the party polarization narrative: 
The Democrats had control of government and passed a major budget deal 
with no Republican votes. Yet, the 1990 and 1997 budget agreements are harder 
for polarization theories to deal with because both were passed by bipartisan 
majorities under divided government during the polarized era. 
As noted, previous case studies of the budget process showed that situational 
factors-concerns about the economic effects of deficits or the national debt, 
deadlines that forced action, and/or public opinion-motivated leaders to 
push for an agreement in spite of obvious differences between the parties. 
Leaders made deficit reduction a priority (often working through setbacks), 
sought to frame choices in the most favorable terms, and either found ways 
to accommodate the policy goals of their partisan bases or risked dissent 
from their partisan constituents, interest groups, or the general public. For 
instance, faced with dramatic automatic spending cuts under the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law in 1990, President Bush made a move that was clearly 
unanticipated by theories of partisan polarization: He reneged on a 1988 
campaign promise not to raise taxes. Bush said that "getting this deficit down, 
continuing economic expansion and employment in this country" trumped 
his "no new taxes" pledge, admitting: "I knew I'd catch some flak on this 
decision, but I've got to do what I think is right:'73 Right or wrong, Bush split 
the Republican Party in Congress. 
Roll-call votes on congressional budget resolutions since 1997, the last year 
majorities of both parties voted together, illustrate partisan polarization.74 Every 
year from 1998 to 2011, huge majorities of Republicans voted in unison and 
in opposition to huge majorities of Democrats on House budget resolutions. 
Over those fourteen years, an average of 98 percent of House Republicans 
voted together and against 97 percemt of Democrats. A similar pattern held in 
the Senate, where an average of 97 percent of Republicans voted together and 
opposite an average of 94 percent of Democrats.75 
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In sum, judging by the acts of Congress, partisan polarization might be 
considered a normal aspect of deficit politics, especially after 1997. However, 
the exceptions are too numerous to ignore and, through process tracing 
methods, scholars have noted the effects of crises, procedural requirements, 
shifts in public opinion, and the actions ofleaders on budget outcomes. 
Hypothesis 2: Parties and Public Opinion 
A second hypothesis relates to public opinion on budget issues. According 
to Abramowitz, public opinion data should reveal clear differences among 
party identifiers across a range of tax, spending, and deficit reduction issues: 
Democrats should hold liberal opinions and Republicans conservative opinions. 
Abramowitz finds that two positions-privatizing Social Security and cutting 
the capital gains tax-correlate highly with conservative ideology, particularly 
among engaged citizens.76 Yet a broader array of survey items indicates that 
Democrats and Republicans divide along party lines on some spending and 
tax questions and converge along others.77 Viewed through this wider lens, 
public opinion might be considered either a source of partisan polarization or 
an opportunity for bipartisan cooperation. 
To begin with, Americans, including both Democrats and Republicans, are 
concerned about deficits and debt. As deficits increase, so does the portion 
of the public who believes deficit and debt are major priorities (Figure 13.4). 
According to a January 2012 report by the Pew Center for the People and the 
Press, "reducing the budget deficit" ranked as the third highest priority from 
a list of twenty-two issues.78 And, although Republicans (84%) were more 
likely than Democrats (66%) to say that "reducing the budget deficit" was a 
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"top priority;' overwhelming majorities of both parties were concerned about 
deficits and debt. 80 
However, partisan identifiers differ strongly on strategies for dealing with 
deficits. During the budget debate in the July of2011, a poll on deficit reduction 
strategies conducted by Gallup found that Republicans ( 67%) were twice as likely 
as Democrats (33%) to support "only or mostly with spending cuts" and six 
times less likely to support "only or mostly with tax increases:' 81 Results from 
questions on tax policy also reveal dear partisan divisions. Republicans (35%} 
are three times more likely than Democrats (12%) to say that "cutting taxes" is 
"the best approach for Congress and the president to take in dealing with the US 
economy:'82 When asked whether "government should or should not redistribute 
wealth by heavy taxes on the rich;' Republicans opposed such taxes by a margin 
of 41 percent, whereas Democrats favored them by a margin of 45% percent.83 
Yet, when it comes to entitlement programs, polls show more convergence 
than differences between partisans. A January 2011 USA/Today Gallup survey 
found at least 60 percent of Democrats and Republicans oppose spending 
cuts in Medicare or Social Security. The same percentage of Democrats and 
Republicans (34%) favored cutting Social Security, and Republicans (40%} 
were only slightly more in favor of cutting Medicare than Democrats (36%).84 
In spite of opposition to cuts, Americans believe those programs are either at or 
nearing a crisis point. A 2011 Gallup Poll found that 34 percent of Americans 
believed that the costs of Medicare and Social Security were "already creating 
a crisis;' and another 33 percent said they would create a crisis "within 10 
years:'85 Moreover, though Republicans (76%) and Independents (70%} were 
more likely than Democrats (54%) to say the programs were in a crisis within 
ten years or less, majorities of both parties see a crisis pending. 
Majorities of both parties also support certain specific ideas to "address 
concerns with the Social Security system;' though the extent of support varies 
by party affiliation.86 When given a list of policy options, majorities of both 
parties agreed that two approaches were "good ideas": (1) "requiring higher 
income workers to pay Social Security on all wages" and (2) "limiting benefits 
for wealthy retirees:' More than 70 percent of Democrats favored those two 
ideas, whereas 60 percent of Republicans favored the first, and 55 percent 
favored the second. Most ideas for reforming Social Security are unpopular 
with both Democrats and Republicans, and there is virtually no difference of 
opinion between them.87 
Thus, we should not be surprised when a Democratic president proposes 
higher taxes on the wealthy and cuts in defense spending. Likewise, Republican 
leaders oppose tax increases and advocate cutting government spending. In 
taking those positions, leaders are reflecting the opinions of their primary 
constituents. Conversely, we can also see why either party may hesitate to cut 
spending for Medicare and Social Security. Yet, given the public's sense that 
those programs are reaching a crisis point, bipartisan support for certain ideas 
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to reform Social Security, and a general agreement that reducing the deficit/ 
debt is a top priority, elected officials of both parties also have incentives to deal 
with those issues.BB 
Hypothesis 3: Parties and Groups 
A third hypothesis relates to the congruence between the interests of groups 
with a stake in the budget and the preferences of political parties in Congress. 
Fiorina argues that the rise in elite polarization has tied the interests of particular 
groups more closely to each of the political parties.B9 If so, data on campaign 
contributions should reveal that groups give regularly to the same party. Yet, 
as in the case of public opinion, the results are mixed. Campaign finance data 
show that certain industries consistently contribute either to Republican or 
Democratic candidates. For each election cycle from 1990 to 2010, political 
action committees from the communications and electronics industries 
typically contributed more to Democrats than Republicans. Lawyers and 
lobbyists gave twice as much, and labor unions gave between seven and thirteen 
times as much, to Democrats as to Republicans. Meanwhile, construction, 
energy and natural resources, agribusiness, and transportation interests 
routinely contribute between two and three times as much to Republicans as to 
Democrats.90 Yet, group campaign contributions do not always cut along party 
lines. For instance, many corporate political action committees (including those 
from finance/real estate/insurance, health, and defense interests) contribute 
more to whichever party holds a majority in Congress.91 
Moreover, looking beyond campaign contributions, both parties are cognizant 
of groups that represent the large numbers of people who receive entitlement 
benefits and tax expenditures (see Table 13.2).92 The number of Americans who 
depend on government entitlement programs grew from 21.7 million (11.7% of 
the population) in 1962 to 67.3 million (21.8% of the population) in 2010.93 Many 
of those entitlements, and especially the tax expenditures, go to middle- and 
upper-middle-income Americans.94 Politicians in both parties like to flatter the 
public by berating the "special interests" that rule Washington. However, given 
the link between organized group interests and the large numbers of Americans 
who benefit from government programs, there is very little distance between 
the great body of the American people and the so-called "special interests:' As 
Rauch points out, "They are, in fact us-you and me:'95 
In sum, the congruence between Republicans and several business 
organizations and Democrats and unions, attorneys, and media-related groups 
suggest a link between some groups and parties. However, other groups swing 
their support in favor of the party that controls Congress, and neither party 
seems to own or wants to offend groups that represent millions of Americans 
who benefit from the tax expenditures that cost revenues and entitlements that 
drive up spending. 
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Table I 3.2 Numbers receiving selected tax expenditures and entitlement benefits 
Tax Expenditures 
Americans with private health insurance (20 I 0) 
Households with tax subsidized retirement account (20 I 0) 
Tax filers claiming a home mortgage interest deduction (2009) 
Tax filers claiming a charitable contribution (2009) 
Tax filers claiming a child tax credit (2009) 
Tax filers claiming student loan interest deduction (2009) 
Tax filers claiming a tuition/fees deduction (2009) 
Entitlement Benefits 
Social Security recipients (20 I I) 
Medicare recipients (20 I I) 
Medicaid recipients (20 I I) 
Sources: See endnote 92 
195,874,000 
80,250,000 
36,541,819 
37,243,302 
23,563,012 
9,718,995 
2,422,642 
55,000,000 
49,000,000 
60,000,000 
Observations from the Budget Control Act of 20 I I 
If there are cases of bi partisan and cross-partisan deal making in a polarized era 
and slack in the relationships between parties, groups, and voters, we might find 
more clues to the puzzle of deficit politics by tracing a process that produces 
a major deficit reduction agreement. By describing the sequence of events and 
actions in the budget process in 2011, we can identify the factors that affected the 
choices and outcomes. A complete application of process tracing would include 
a comprehensive timeline of events and more detailed analysis of proposals, 
actions by various actors, and decisions (i.e., empirical information drawn 
from news accounts, government documents and interviews). Obvious limits 
prevent such detail here, but we can trace the process enough to determine the 
extent to which polarization affected the outcome. The process that culminated 
in the Budget Control Act of201 lreveals evidence of party polarization and the 
limits of polarization as an explanation for deficit politics. In an atmosphere of 
crisis, leaders continue to seek bipartisan and cross-partisan approaches to the 
debt problem. 
As the Democratic nominee for president in 2008, Barack Obama 
campaigned against Bush's fiscal policy and the excessive partisanship in 
Washington. Shortly after an overwhelming victory in the 2008 elections that 
gave Democrats control of the White House and Congress, President Obama 
and congressional Democrats pursued a Keynesian policy of deficit spending 
designed to stimulate the economy. In February of 2009, Congress passed 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, popularly referred to as the 
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"stimulus bill;' a $787 billion package of tax cuts and spending increases. Not 
a single Republican voted for the bill in the House.96 The political situation 
changed dramatically after the 20 IO midterm elections, when the Republicans 
won sixty-one House seats and majority control of the body.97 The leaders of 
the two parties began 2011 on separate planets but, after budget deadlines and 
concerns about the debt forced them, together they agreed to a deficit reduction 
plan that was historic in scale, yet modest in relation to the size of the debt. 
When President Obama presented the Fiscal Year 2012 budget in January 
2011, he ignored the recommendations of the Commission he had appointed 
a year earlier to reduce the debt and asked Congress for a bill to raise the 
statutory ceiling on the national debt, which was due to expire that summer. 
However, newly elected "Tea Party" Republicans in the House and Senate 
informed party leaders that they would oppose raising the debt ceiling, at 
least without a major plan to reduce the debt. 98 In April, House Republicans, 
led by Budget Committee Chair Ryan (R-IL), drafted a budget resolution that 
cut spending by nearly $6 trillion over ten years. The plan proposed to reduce 
Medicare costs by replacing the government's fee-for-service program with a 
"premium support" plan whereby eligible senior citizens would receive a credit 
for purchasing private health insurance.99 On April 15, the House passed the 
budget resolution by a vote of 235 to 193; Republicans voted 235 to 4 in favor, 
and all 189 Democrats voted against the budget. 
On April 13, just days before the House voted on the budget resolution, 
President Obama rebuked Ryan's Medicare plan and stated: "It's not going 
to happen as long as I am President:'100 He made a counter offer that cut the 
budget by $4 trillion over ten years through a combination of tax increases and 
spending cuts and called on congressional leaders to form a bipartisan group 
with Vice President Joe Biden to work out a budget agreement.101 In just two 
years, President Obama's fiscal policy took a 180-degree turn, from a strategy 
to stimulate the economy with massive deficit spending, to a proposal to reduce 
the debt. With annual deficits exceeding $1 trillion, polls registering public 
concern about deficits and debt, and a consensus among policy experts that 
the debt was unsustainable, deficit reduction vaulted to the top of the policy 
agenda. 
The threat of default on the national debt and a downgrade in the credit 
rating of U.S. Treasury securities compelled the White House and congressional 
leaders of both parties to negotiate a budget deal. Just one day before the 
Treasury would run out of authority to borrow, Congress passed the Budget 
Control Act of 2011, which cut spending by $900 billion and established a joint 
bipartisan congressional committee to find another $1.5 trillion of savings 
by the end of the year. In the House, Republicans voted 17 4 to 66 in favor of 
the bill, and Democrats split evenly 95 to 95; in the Senate, majorities of both 
parties supported the agreement: Democrats voted 46 to 7, and Republicans 
voted 28 to 19 in favor of the bill. 102 
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In addition to the roll-call votes, several aspects of the process did not reflect 
the expectations of partisan polarization. First, during the summer of 2011, 
President Obama and Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner came 
close to forging a deal that would have increased taxes and reformed Medicare 
and Social Security.103 In his speech to the House, Boehner noted, "I stuck my 
neck out a mile. And I put revenues on the table, in order to try to come to 
an agreement .. :•rn4 Second, a group of Senators called the "Gang of 6"-three 
Republicans and three Democrats-negotiated a package of entitlement and 
tax reforms that would have saved $3.7 trillion over ten years. 105 Third, once 
the joint congressional committee's work was underway, a bipartisan group 
of 100 members of the House lobbied the committee to "go big;' indicating 
that they would vote for legislation that contained spending cuts and new 
revenues that saved $4 trillion, more than twice the $1.5 billion prescribed 
by the agreement. !06 Fourth, during the super-committee negotiations, 
a group of business organizations, including the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the Business Round table, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
urged the committee to find additional savings: "We believe it is crucial to act 
expeditiously to rein in spending, reform the tax code, reduce the deficit, and 
stabilize and ultimately lower America's level of debt ... Congress must reform 
entitlement programs and comprehensively restructure the U.S. tax code:'107 
Fifth, conservative Republican Pat Toomey (R-PA) agreed to $300 billion in 
new revenues in exchange for lower tax rates, and Democrats broached the 
issue of entitlement reform. 108 Fifth, as the parties were negotiating the deal, a 
Gallup Poll found that more than 60 percent of Americans, including majorities 
of Republicans and Democrats, wanted their leaders to "agree to a compromise 
plan, even if it is a plan you disagree with:'109 Finally, as 2011 drew to a close, 
Ryan and Senate Democrat Ron Wyden (D-OR) announced a bipartisan plan 
to reform Medicare. uo 
Yet, in spite of those developments and the fact that Congress and the 
President agreed to the largest deficit reduction package in history, partisan 
polarization constrained the scale and scope of budget savings.m By 2011, the 
debt had grown so large that the law's $2.4 trillion in projected savings over 
ten years was not enough to slow the rising debt to a sustainable level. 112 In 
addition, the budget savings were limited to discretionary spending; nothing 
was done to reform the tax code or entitlements. Democratic Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) singled out entitlement policy in her speech in 
favor of the bill on the House floor: " ... the most important assignment given 
to the Democratic leadership going to the table: Make sure there are no cuts 
in benefits in Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security. That was achieved:'u3 
Moreover, although policymakers eluded gridlock in the summer, party 
polarization prevailed later that year. Negotiators on the joint congressional 
committee considered a range of tax and entitlement options, but they reached 
a stalemate over taxes and adjourned without an agreement. u4 Under the terms 
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of the Budget Control Act, those savings would come from automatic spending 
cuts scheduled for 2013. Most Americans, including a majority of Republicans 
and a sizeable portion of Democrats, blamed both parties for the committee's 
failure.11 5 
Conclusion 
The nation's struggle over the federal debt can be understood only by grappling 
with the complex role of party politics in the budget process. As institutions 
that seek primarily to gain political power by winning elections, parties must be 
responsive to the priorities and opinions of their primary constituents. To the 
extent that Democratic and Republican voters have grown apart on spending 
and tax issues and interest groups line up on either side of the divide, party 
leaders are bound to reflect opposing perspectives on the budget and will 
struggle to reconcile their differences. At the same time, however, party leaders 
cannot ignore the general public's concern about the debt and the popularity of 
the programs that drive up that debt. They must also be aware of the increasing 
number of Americans who identify as Independents,116 polls that reflect a 
public interest in compromise, and the consensus among policy experts about 
the need for entitlement and tax reform. At the very least, leaders must pay 
attention to factions within their parties that make the debt a priority, promote 
policy reforms that reduce debt, and support bipartisan negotiations. 
From the vantage point of process tracing, the relationship between 
partisanship and the debt dilemma reveals a mixed picture. Though partisan 
polarization is clearly evident in budget politics, the relationships between 
public opinion, interest groups, and elected officials are not as tightly linked as 
one might expect from theories that explain partisan polarization. Moreover, 
although partisan polarization limits the capacity ofleaders to negotiate deficit 
reduction agreements across party lines, it does not incapacitate them. Under 
certain situations-perceived crises, legislatively imposed deadlines, and public 
concern about the debt-party leaders may raise the deficit above other budget 
priorities, take political risks, and negotiate agreements that advance spending 
cuts or tax increases. 
Looking forward, the stakes could not be higher. Former Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen announced in August of 2010: 
"The most significant threat to our national security is our debt:' 117 Public 
concerns about debt and the future of entitlements are only going to increase 
as the political and economic effects of the European debt crisis unfold and the 
reality of an aging and dependent baby boom population sinks in. Of course, 
the United States is not in the same condition as countries such as Portugal, 
Italy, Greece, or Spain. However, in 2010, the United States had the eleventh 
highest debt-to-GDP ratio of the thirty-four countries in the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development.118 
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Evidence from the process-tracing approach suggests that the future of 
deficit politics is likely to continue to reflect a mixture of polarized politics 
and attempts to address the debt problem. Party leaders have some discretion 
in terms of how the process unfolds. Given the polarizing forces in American 
politics, party leaders can always retreat to the priorities of their base donors, 
groups, and voters. Yet, if they focus on solving the debt problem, leaders 
may loosen their ties to primary constituents, expand their conception of 
representation, and frame policy choices in ways that protect their parties' 
electoral goals and advance constructive approaches to debt reduction. They 
may justify deviations from partisan priorities by expressing concerns about 
the debt's effects on the nation's children or grandchildren, suggesting that their 
obligations as representatives extend beyond the voters that participate in the 
next election. Instead of talking about entitlement reform in terms of cutting 
spending for the elderly, leaders could agree to "preserve and strengthen Social 
Security and Medicare:' 119 In spite of the increased partisan polarization since 
the 1970s, there is still enough flexibility in the relationships among voters, 
groups, and elected representatives for party leaders to advance reforms that 
control entitlement spending and reduce the debt. The questions are: Will they 
choose to do so, and will their efforts be sufficient to avoid the worst effects of 
a debt crisis? 
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